Existing routing protocols for self-organizing networks and their multipath extensions have a number of vulnerabilities and may be affected by malicious nodes. The paper discusses one of the vulnerabilities of the multipath extension for the OLSR routing protocol related to finding multiple routes that intersect at the malicious node. To counter this vulnerability, we proposed a special reputation-based routing metric and an algorithm for finding a given number of node-disjoint paths in non-increasing order of the metric values. The considered vulnerability and the main idea of the proposed approach are demonstrated by examples.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many key performance indicators and properties of various wireless self-organizing networks directly depend on the routing protocol used in the network. The first routing protocols were designed to find a single optimal path to any destination node. Because wireless self-organizing networks have dynamic topology, multipath routing protocols are better suited for such networks. Multipath routing protocols provide several alternative routes for packet delivery. The use of multipath routing in self-organizing networks can improve the network reliability, increase the lifetime of network connections, reduce end-to-end delays and the number of errors. In addition, it can be used for load balancing and securing of transmitted data. In this regard, the widely used routing protocols for self-organizing networks, such as OLSR and AODV, have been extended to provide multipath routing (MP-OLSR and MP-AODV, respectively).
The Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol [1] is the best-known proactive routing protocol for self-organizing networks. According to the specifications of this protocol, each node periodically broadcasts HELLO messages to notify neighboring nodes and collects the tables of nodes available within one-hop and two-hop distance. Among all the one-hop neighboring nodes, each node selects a subset of Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes that provide connection to all the two-hop neighboring nodes. Each node selected as MPR broadcasts Topology Control (TC) messages, which must contain advertisements of routes to the selector nodes that have chosen this node as an MPR. These messages are received and processed by all neighboring nodes, but only the nodes selected as MPRs retransmit such messages over the network. Based on the received control messages, each node maintains a network topology and calculates the optimal routes to all destinations. As a result, only MPR nodes can participate in the forwarding of data packets.
II. MULTIPATH EXTENSION OF THE OLSR ROUTING PROTOCOL
MP-OLSR, unlike the original OLSR protocol, combines the principles of proactive and reactive routing [2] . On the one hand, this protocol extension also specifies that each node should periodically send HELLO and TC messages and collect information about the topology. On the other hand, network nodes no longer recalculate their routing tables regularly. Instead, every time a node needs to send data to another node, it must first find multiple routes to the destination node, and then put these routes directly into the packets. It is important that different batches of data can be delivered via different routes, but only single route is always specified in any packet. Intermediate nodes simply required to forward the packet to the next hop in accordance with the route specified in the packet. This approach eliminates complex computations of the multipath routing table each time a node receives OLSR control messages.
Finding K routes to a destination node in the multipath extension of OLSR is performed using the modified Dijkstra's algorithm [3] . For this, the network topology is considered as a loopless directed graph G=(V,E) with a cost c(e) on each arc eE, which is the value of the metric used. Each of the K paths is found using the original Dijkstra's algorithm in the modified graph G. The idea of proposed modification is to increase the cost of some arcs at the end of each step of the algorithm. The cost increasing is performed using the following functions:
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MP-OLSR also has two additional features that are designed to work with dynamic network topology. Information about the network topology stored in the topology information base may be outdated, since HELLO and TC messages are sent with some delay, and errors may occur during the transmission of these messages. The divergence between the actual topology and the network graph generated using the OLSR information base may invalidate the route specified by the source node.
In order to avoid routing through obsolete routes, a route recovery method was proposed in MP-OLSR. Before the intermediate node forwards a packet, it must check whether the next hop on the packet route is its real neighbor. If so, the packet is routed along the original path. Otherwise, the route is recalculated, and the packet is routed along a new path. This approach increases the packet delivery ratio. In addition, the route recovery does not lead to significant additional delays, since each node simply checks the information on the table of neighboring nodes and does not perform useless computations.
Since calculating a new path as part of the route recovery can create a routing loop, the node checks the found path and uses it only if there is no loop. This method allows nodes to avoid routing loops effectively without additional memory costs. The use of this approach has significantly reduced endto-end delays in networks with dynamic topology and improved the performance of network connections in general.
Like OLSR, the MP-OLSR multipath extension uses the number of hops as the base route metric. The question of using quality of service (QoS) metrics for MP-OLSR in order to change its performance and to secure the protocol remains open [4] .
III. COUNTERMEASURES TO VULNERABILITIES OF MP-OLSR
Routing security is one of the fundamental problems of wireless self-organizing networks. Since in such networks each node can perform packet routing for other nodes, there is a wide class of network attacks on routing protocols. In particular, the original OLSR routing protocol is vulnerable to the packet dropping attacks. One possible goal of the attack is to disrupt the information base by blocking control packets of the routing protocol. The taxonomy presented in [4] classifies such attacks into two categories.
The first category includes attacks performed for the incorrect MPR selection. In this case, the malicious node either selects an incomplete set of MPR nodes or affect other nodes to calculate a wrong MPR set. To calculate the set of MPRs, each node uses the neighbor information base that contains information about one-hop and two-hop neighboring nodes, so to perform an attack, the malicious node may either spoof HELLO messages or not report existent links to other nodes. This leads to the fact that the victim node calculates a wrong set of MPRs, that is, either at least one of its actual two-hop neighbors are not reached via nodes from its MPR set or the malicious node may be falsely selected as MPR.
The second category includes attacks of incorrect relaying. In this case, the malicious node selected as MPR by the victim node does not generate TC messages or does not relay valid TC messages from other nodes. In another variant of the attack, the node may create incorrect or incomplete TC messages and eliminate some information contained in TC messages generated by other nodes.
In [6] , a model of the incorrect relaying attack was proposed and implemented in ns-3 simulator for the OLSR routing protocol. Such an attack of the malicious node causes the other network nodes to receive incomplete information about the network topology and calculate an inadequate network graph that do not correspond the actual topology. Since cryptographic protection is not effective against internal malicious nodes, the detection and isolation of such nodes is possible based on the concept of trust and reputation [7] .
Existing multipath extensions of the OLSR routing protocol are also vulnerable to flooding disruptions attacks, which are performed in order to incorrect route calculation by other nodes. A malicious node can deny relaying control messages, or it can select a wrong MPR set so that normal nodes cannot find multiple disjoint paths to other network nodes. In addition, the multipath extension of OLSR initially does not guarantee the finding of disjoint paths. The malicious node achieves the goal if multiple paths found intersect, and the malicious node is included in each of them.
For example, consider the network topology graph shown in Fig. 1 . The source node s attempts to find two paths to the destination node t. The malicious node m advertises fake nodes f 1 , f 2 and corresponding fake links by spoofing HELLO and TC messages. , (m,f 1 ) is increased using penalty functions (Fig. 2) . The second obtained path is p 2 = (s, s-m, m, m-f 1 , f 1 , f 1 -f 2 , f 2 , f 2 -t, t) with the cost of 7. Thus, using multipath Dijkstra's algorithm specified in MP-OLSR, node s calculated two paths that intersect in malicious node m. In order to counter this vulnerability of the MP-OLSR multipath extension, we propose to use the Boolean-valued reputation model originally introduced for the single path OLSR. In this model, each node s determines the local reputation value r si  {0,1} of all other nodes i = 1,...,n and, using these values, constructs a reputation vector.
The local reputation of a link from node u to node v is calculated by node s as:
Further, all nodes exchange reputation vectors and, using the obtained reputation vectors, determine the global reputation of the link:
As a result of cooperation, all nodes determine the global reputation of all network links. The global reputation of a route corresponding to the path p = (s, e 0 , ..., e j , t) is defined as:
A non-negative integer obtained as the algebraic sum of all elements of the path global reputation is called the trust level of the path. We assume that the most trusted path between a source node s and a destination node t is the s-t path, all arcs of which are simultaneously recommended by the maximum number of nodes, or in other words, the s-t path with the maximum possible trust level. In [8] , an algorithm was proposed for finding a single s-t path with the maximum possible trust level.
In accordance with the specification of the OLSR multipath extension [2] , instead of using the modified multipath Dijkstra's algorithm, a different algorithm can be used to find a given number of s-t paths. To secure the OLSR multipath extension, we propose to use the trust level as the routing metric and introduce an algorithm to find a set of multiple paths that satisfies the following properties:
1. All paths from the required set must be node-disjoint.
2. The trust level of any path that is not included in the required set and does not intersect with all other paths of the set should not exceed the trust level of any of the paths in the set.
IV. AN ALGORITHM FOR FINDING MULTIPLE SECURE PATHS
Finding the most trusted paths can help to avoid routing through malicious nodes and the use of only node-disjoint paths can help to counteract flooding disruption attacks performed by a single internal malicious node, since the malicious node will not be included in two or more routes simultaneously. Based on the algorithm for finding a single s-t path with the maximum possible trust level, we propose an algorithm for finding a set of K node-disjoint paths in nonincreasing order of trust level (Fig. 3) . Fig. 3 . The algorithm for finding a set of K most trusted node-disjoint paths To find the K paths, it is necessary to perform K steps of the algorithm. Each step of the algorithm is used to find a single path with the maximum trust level in G and modify the graph G after that. To obtain a modified graph, all nodes and the arcs leading to them that are included in the found path must be deleted from the current graph.
For example, in Fig. 4 , node v 1 attempts to find two paths to node v 5 . Using the algorithm for finding the most trusted path, The second path calculated in the modified graph is 5 , v 5 ) with the global reputation b(p 2 ) = {a 1 a 2 a 4 a 5 } and the trust level of 4 ( Fig. 5 ). It should be noted that the paths found are node-disjoint, which excludes the possibility of the flooding disruption attack performed by a single internal malicious node. The time complexity of the algorithm is O(Kn 3 ).
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, the flooding disruption attack remains relevant for OLSR multipath extensions. In particular, the Dijkstra's modified multipath algorithm in the MP-OLSR extension does not guarantee that the paths found are disjoint, and the malicious node can affect other nodes so that the routes calculated by the nodes intersect at the malicious node. The Boolean-valued reputation metric and the algorithm for finding the set of secure paths, proposed in this paper, helps to find K paths in non-increasing order of trust level, which are necessarily node-disjoint, if they exist. Alternatively, the modified Bhandari's algorithm [9] can also be used to find multiple disjoint paths with the maximum possible global reputation value. In the case when multiple disjoint paths does not exist, it remains possible to use a single path with a maximum cardinality of the global reputation as the most secure path.
